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THE ROLE OF ORIGINAL INTENT IN READING A
TWO HUNDRED YEAR OLD CONSTITUTION
DARRELL V. MCGRAW, JR.*
ELIZABETH L. CRITTENDEN**
I. INTRODUCTION
America is celebrating the two hundredth anniversary of the na-
tion's constitution, the most durable blueprint for self-governance
ever written. Yet this very celebration has been the occasion for
serious debate regarding the continued relevance of the Constitution
and how the courts best should read it in a world so changed from
that known to its framers. In a July 1985 speech to the American
Bar Association, the Attorney General of the United States ex-
amined the judiciary's role as a bulwark of a limited constitution
and called for a return to a jurisprudence of original intention.' He
attacked the doctrine of incorporation which applies the federal bill
of rights to the states, the activism of the current United States
Supreme Court,2 and recent rulings of that Court which he said were
reflective of a "jurisprudence of idiosyncrasy.'' 3 In advocating a
jurisprudence of original intention, he admonished the members of
the bar that "the Constitution is a limitation on judicial power as
well as executive and legislative" and maintained that such a jur-
isprudence "would produce defensible principles of government that
would not be tainted by ideological predilection." '4
The Attorney General's simply phrased description of a juris-
prudence of original intention is, on the surface, uncontroversial.
* Chief Justice, West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. B.A., West Virginia University,
1961; L.L.B., West Virginia University, 1964; M.A., West Virginia University, 1977.
** Law Clerk to Chief Justice McGraw; B.A. University of Alabama in Birmingham, 1972;
J.D., West Virginia University, 1985.
1 See Meese, The Attorney General's View of the Supreme Court: Toward a Jurisprudence
of Original Intention, 45 PuB. Anaml. REv. 701 (1985) (based on the ABA address).
2 Id. at 704.
Id. at 702.
4 Id. at 704.
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Where the language of the Constitution is specific, it must be obeyed. Where
there is a demonstrable consensus among the Framers and the ratifiers as to a
principle stated or implied by the Constitution, it should be followed. Where there
is ambiguity as to the precise meaning or reach of a constitutional provision, it
should be interpreted and applied in a manner so as to at least not contradict
the text of the Constitution itself.,
United States Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan countered
the Attorney General's attack in a speech at Georgetown University,
saying that his position "feigns self-effacing deference to the
specific judgments of those who forged our original social compact.
But in truth it is little more than arrogance cloaked as humility."' 6
The Justice asserted that the Attorney General's presumption against
claims of constitutional right would require judges to "turn a blind
eye to social progress." ' 7-According to Justice Brennan, it was not
the purpose of the Constitution to enshrine the status quo, and the
genius of the Constitution lies not in any static meaning, but rather
in "the adaptability of its great principles to cope with current prob-
lems and current needs." 8
With such emotionally charged statements, the seemingly arcane
matter of constitutional interpretation has become an issue of im-
portance to many outside of academia. Various theories of consti-
tutional interpretation have become identified with degrees of judicial
restraint or activism, leading the popular press and anyone with even
a passing interest in the law to invade the once esoteric territory of
jurisprudential scholars. 9 This essay examines the different methods
Meese, Construing the Constitution, 19 U. C. DAvis L. REv. 22, 26 (1985). While most
would agree with Meese's description, his position appears to some to amount to a presumption
against claims to constitutional rights, not merely taking care not to contradict the constitutional text.
See Levy, Pro Se, 15 STUDENT LAW. 36 (1986).
6 Brennan, The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. Tnx. L.
REv. 433, 435 (1986). Others agree with Justice Brennan that Meese's position is not completely
guileless. His campaign for judicial restraint is said to have a fluctuating content, favoring activism
when it comes to cutting back civil rights and civil liberties. Schwartz, Mr. Meese and the Bill of
Rights, 6 CAL. LAW. 35, 38-39 (1986). According to Schwartz, "Meese's assault on the Bill of Rights
is supported neither by history nor by any reasonable and practical constitutional interpretation. It
is not a call to 'serious debate,' only a device for diminishing our basic freedoms." Id. at 63.
Brennan, supra note 6, at 436.
Id. at 438.
Colson, Is the Constitution Out of Date?, 30 CiiusTAuirrv TODAY, 48 (1986) compares press
coverage of the Meese-Brennan dispute to fast food, with each issue "served up in neat packages
with catchy labels; an impatient public may get instant gratification but little nourishment."
[Vol. 90
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of interpreting a written constitution, considers the concept of orig-
inal intent, and reflects on the paramount importance of the words
of the text in carrying out the judicial review function.
II. METHODS OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
While legal writers use dozens of terms in describing methods
of constitutional interpretation, for the purpose of this essay, these
various methods may be categorized as either originalist or non-
originalist.
An originalist "accords binding authority to the text of the Con-
stitution or the intentions of its adopters." 10 Originalists feel that
those adopting the Constitution and its amendments "definitively
order[ed] relationships, and that such an ordering is binding on all
organs of government until changed by amendment."'" Insofar as
the judiciary is concerned, this premise is often stated in the maxim
that "courts should apply, not make, law.' '1 2 According to origi-
nalists, the framers "assumed the existence of an objective body of
principles, largely Judeo-Christian in origin" and did not expect
judges to operate according to their own concepts of fairness.'3 The
concept of originalism, holding that intent can be discerned from
the Constitution, possesses what has been termed "rule of law" vir-
tues, including promotion of certainty, predictability, and ad-
ministrative efficiency.1
4
The first, and for the strict textualist the only, step in explicating
the Constitution is the examination of the words of the document
itself.'5 To anyone with a textualist inclination, it would be an error
,0 Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204 (1980).
Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 353, 376 (1981).
, See Graglia, How the Constitution Disappeared, 20 COMMENTARY 19 (1986); Berger, Con-
stitutional Law and the Constitution, 19 SoUFOLK U. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1985).
13 Colson, supra note 9, at 48.
4 See Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist Interpretation
be Justified?, 73 CALiF. L. REv. 1482, 1485 (1985).
Although most writers speak of strict textualists and their absolute refusal to consider "parole
evidence" in ascertaining constitutional meaning, see Monaghan, supra note 11, at 374, it is difficult
to find anyone admitting to holding this interpretive theory since the eighteenth century anti-her-
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to seek the meaning of a constitutional provision as if it were some-
thing separate and apart from the meaning of the document's lan-
guage.' 6 Madison's interpretive theory stressed that the text of the
Constitution was the primary source of determining the framers'
intent. 7 Black's Handbook on the Construction and Interpretation
of Laws explains that the people's intention "is to be sought in the
constitution itself, and the apparent meaning of the words employed
is to be taken as expressing it, except in cases where that assumption
would lead to absurdity, ambiguity, or contradiction." 8 Consistent
with this approach, Chief Justice Marshall wrote that although the
spirit of the Constitution "is to be respected not less than its letter,
yet the spirit is to be collected chiefly from its words."' 9
Larry G. Simon, a critic of the originalist school, accurately de-
scribed its three underlying assumptions: that there existed an iden-
tifiable collective state of mind when the Constitution was adopted;
that this intent can be discerned from the language of that document
and the legal and social context surrounding its adoption; and that
the meaning thus found should be authoritative. 20 These assumptions
are eminently defensible. That there is such a thing as an identifiable
collective state of mind and that this intent is to be followed are
basic premises upon which our legal system deals with all written
law. "The true object of all interpretation is to ascertain the meaning
and will of the law-making body, to the end that it [sic] may be
enforced.' 2' To accept what is apparently the nonoriginalist's con-
tention - that there was no identifiable collective state of mind
when our Constitution was drafted and adopted - is to say that
the document upon which our government is founded is a mean-
ingless scribble and that all of the grand constitutional debates and
struggles were "as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal." ' 22 This is
not to say that there is no disagreement in the historical record
" See G. A. ENDLICH, A COMMENTARY ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES § 8 (1888).
17 Powell, supra note 15, at 937.
"1 H. C. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND THE INTERPRETATION OF LAWS 15 (1896).
19 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 202 (1819).
20 Simon, supra note 14, at 1483-84.
21 BLACK, supra note 18, at 8.
22 1 Corinthians 13:1.
[Vol. 90
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regarding the meaning of the Constitution or any of its provisions.
Such disagreement was, after all, the reason for many of the debates.
Rather, the originalist would contend that from the records of the
proceedings and from an examination of the historical and social
context, intent is discernible. 23 Debates at Philadelphia and state con-
ventions, the Federalist essays, and even the writings of opponents
to the proposed Constitution provide originalists with ample "con-
temporaneous expositions" upon which to draw the intent of any
particular provision.
24
Closely related to the concept of determining original intent is
the matter of "interpretive intent," how the adopters meant for the
Constitution to be interpreted. The United States Constitution was
the first written statement of a nation's fundamental laws. Thus,
constitutional exegesis in the courts as we know it was a new de-
velopment. 25 This is not to say that this judicial task occurred in a
vacuum. The courts had a rich tradition in the common law, at-
tempting to derive general principles from individual cases to provide
consistency and uniformity in the legal system.26 Accustomed to
reading legal instruments according to set rules such as those detailed
by Blackstone and others, 27 judges were both experienced and pro-
ficient at sorting through evidence surrounding the creation of a
legal document to determine its underlying meaning. The Philadel-
phia drafters did not include in the Constitution any rules as to how
" Much constitutional scholarship has concentrated on the matter of whose intent was to be
discerned. When Americans first sought to interpret the Constitution
the original intent relevant to constitutional discourse was not that of the Philadelphia
framers, but rather that of the parties to the constitutional compact - the states as political
entities .... To the extent that constitutional interpreters considered historical evidence to have
any interpretative value, what they deemed relevant was evidence of the proceedings of the
state ratifying conventions, not the intent of the framers. Only later, during the breakdown
of the Republican consensus, did the attention of constitutional interpreters gradually shift
from the "intention" of the sovereign states to the personal intentions of individual historical
actors.
J Powell, supra note 15, at 888.
Id. at 918 (quoting 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 495-96 (1796); see C. J. ANTiEAu, CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRUCTON §§§ 3.11-.12 (1982).
15 Powell, supra note 15, at 887 n.11.
26 Note, Penumbras and Privacy: A Study of the Use of Fictions in Constitutional Decision-
Making, 87 W. VA. L. Rnv. 859, 862 (1985).
27 C. WOLFE, THE RISE oF MODERN JUDICIAL REvIEw 18 (1986).
19871
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it was to be read.2 8 Based on discussion surrounding the ratification
process, it appears that the adopters were primarily concerned that
the words themselves be emphasized and believed that the rules rel-
evant to statutory construction would be applied if necessary. 29 The
individual opinions and intentions of the founding fathers were not
given particularly great import in defining constitutional parameters
until the 1830's.1° Rather, the adopters and courts of the framers'
era often made recourse to the plain meaning rule, indicating what
was essentially a textualist interpretive approach.3
Not all originalists are classified as textualists or intentionalists.
Moderate originalists are those who believe that the Constitution's
text is authoritative, but who read the language of many of its pro-
visions as inherently open-textured. This approach is consistent with
an assumed high level of generality in the adopter's interpretive in-
tent.32 Moderate originalists view the Constitution as consisting of
two types of clauses: specific clauses, usually referring to institutions
of government, which must be given their historical meaning; and
more open-textured clauses, usually dealing with rights and powers,
which may be properly adapted to more modern meanings.3 3 While
moderate originalists fully accept the idea that constitutional law
may properly be adapted to a changing world, their position is that
"the specific intentions of the framers establish a minimum or core
meaning of the various provisions of the Constitution. Although
subsequent generations may expand constitutional provisions beyond
that core meaning, the core itself is inviolable. ' 34
Nonoriginalists are not willing to wear even that loose fitting
mantle. They give weight to the text and history of the Constitution,
but feel that with changing experiences and perceptions, the courts
21 Id. at 17. The text of the Constitution, however, does indicate that framers recognized that
the normal rules of construction and the common law would be applied. See U.S. CoNsT. amend.
XI, & amend. VII.
29 Powell, supra note 15, at 887, 904; Monaghan, supra note 11, at 392.
3 Powell, supra note 15, at 945-47. (Powell's article contains an excellent, detailed historical
account of the evolution of the concept of interpretive intent.).
31 Brest, supra note 10, at 215.
32 Id. at 205, 223.
11 Monaghan, supra note 11, at 361.
34 Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MIcH. L. Ra,. 1033, 1061 (1981).
[Vol. 90
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should be guided by a "normative thesis" based on the ends of
constitutional government. 35 They regard "constitutional law not as
an expression of values written into the Constitution by the framers,
but as the product of a continuing process of valuation carried on
by those to whom the task of constitutional interpretation has been
entrusted." '36 As nonoriginalist Paul Brest explained, "one can better
protect fundamental values and the integrity of democratic processes
by protecting them than by guessing how other people meant to
govern a different society a hundred or more years ago." '3 7 Non-
originalists argue that it is impossible to ascertain the exact intent
of the adopters, that the adopters themselves may not have meant
to bind future generations to their interpretation, and that original
intent jurisprudence weakens the role of the judiciary in our system
of checks and balances.3 Nonoriginalists also argue that modern
generations did not forge the social compact which is the written
Constitution and that "those who did .are dead and gone." ' 39 Simon
argues that the true basis of the Constitution's authority is found
in what he describes as an attitude of political morality. He believes
that this attitude is shared by many Americans, based on a belief
in values such as democracy, freedom, equality, and justice.
40
III. THE CONCEPT OF ORIGINAL INTENT
Controversy over "original intent" is not new among readers of
the Constitution. Around 1800, the Republicans called for an in-
terpretive strategy which adhered to the original intent underlying
the Constitution. This original version of original intent emphasized
the importance of conceptualizing the Constitution as a compact
entered into by sovereign states. 41 More recently, William Winslow
Crosskey and Raoul Berger have produced works on constitutional
" Brest, supra note 10, at 205.
'6 Sandalow, supra note 34, at 1034.
' Brest, supra note 10, at 238.
' Tepker, "The Defects of Better Motives": Reflections on Mr. Meese's Jurisprudence of Orig-
inal Intention, 39 OKLa. L. REv. 23, 26 (1986); see Simon, supra note 14, at 1501; Sandalow, supra
note 34, at 1036.
"1 Brest, supra note 10, at 225.
40 Simon, supra note 14, at 1487-89.
" Powell, supra note 15, at 887.
1987l
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history setting forth theories of judicial review based on their con-
cepts of original intent.42 Each of these ideas of original intent shares,
along with the Attorney General's current campaign, the goal of
restricting the federal judiciary's power over the state governments.
Thus, the recurring calls for a jurisprudence of original intent are,
in all likelihood, more ideologically based than grounded in any
purely intellectual effort to purify the judicial process.
Under a textualist's approach to the concept of original intent,
the word original may be defined as "of or relating to a rise or
beginning: existing from the start . . .constituting a source, begin-
ning, or first reliance. 43 Intent includes "[T]hat which is intended;
purpose ... [T]he state of mind operative at the time of an ac-
tion."44 Thus, in seeking to apply a jurisprudence of original intent,
we should first rely on the state of mind of the framers and adopters
when the Constitution was born.
The men who wrote the Constitution were heavily influenced by
the rationalist social theory of the Enlightenment. 45 Thomas Jef-
ferson had incorporated the theories of John Locke into the Dec-
laration of Independence. 46 After it became necessary to replace the
Articles of Confederation, that Declaration was the only existing
document of precedential importance available to the framers. The
Enlightenment was characterized by the idea of the possibility of
progress; "[a]s social dissatisfaction, and hopes, mounted late in the
18th century, the idea of scientific and intellectual progress quietly
slipped into a belief in the general progress of man, moral no less
than material." 47 These men drafting the Constitution were pro-
gressives, 48 believing in a jurisprudence of natural law.49 Under this
jurisprudence, neither the Constitution nor the federal government
42 Brest, supra note 10, at 219 n.55.
41 Webster's infra note 65, at 1592.
. AmERicAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 668 (1981).
41 See Powell, supra note 15, at 892.
41 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA Enlightenment 893 (15th ed. 1978).
41 Id. at 894.
4" Or, as the term was most often used then, liberals. See American Heritage Dictionary, supra
note 44, at 1045 (defining progressive as "3. Promoting or favoring political reform; liberal.") By the
time the Constitution was drafted, many of the Tories (conservatives) had removed themselves to New
Brunswick following the Treaty of Paris signed on September 3, 1783.
49 See Tepker, supra note 38, at 29.
[Vol. 90
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granted citizens rights. Rather, these rights were "possessed by all
men equally by nature. . . [but] require a well governed civil society
for their security." 0 As Pennsylvanian John Dickenson said of these
rights,
They are created in us by the decrees of Providence, which establish the laws of
our nature. They are born with us; exist with us; and cannot be taken from us
by any human power without taking our lives. In short, they are founded on the
immutable maxims of reason and justice."
As is reflected in the quote immediately above, there was a devel-
oping pattern of combining political thought and the beliefs of the
Reformation. 2 Many writers of the Enlightenment, however, strug-
gled to garb theological standards in secular clothing. The Consti-
tution was the preeminent legal document to emerge from the
Enlightenment. The Attorney General, with his "non-ideological"
argument for original intent, tries to disguise the Enlightenment/
natural law philosophy of the framers under positivist garb, denying
to Americans those rights not explicitly detailed in the Constitution.
The law is infected throughout with discussions of intent, but when
we apply the concept of intent to our constitutional forefather's
anticipatory state of mind as to how future generations would read
their work product, reason would lead us to believe that they would
have us liberally interpret any recognition of individual rights con-
tained therein.5 4
Rather than decry the so-called corruption through expansion of
individual rights undertaken by the nation's high court in the past
fifty years, it would probably be more appropriate to celebrate the
fact that our judicial system has finally arrived at the stage antic-
ipated by its drafters two centuries ago. The founding fathers did
not anticipate a judiciary without discretionary powers or the ability
to weigh policy considerations. 5 The early Constitutional amend-
3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AmERiCAN CONSTITUTION 1301, 1302 (1986).
" Tepker, supra note 38, at 29.
52 BRITANNICA, supra note 46, at 892.
" This in spite of the specific language of the ninth amendment that "[t]he enumeration in
the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people."
14 See ANTmAu, supra note 24, at 34; BLACK, supra note 18, at 13.
" Posner, What Am I? A Potted Plant?, THE NEw REPuBLic, Sept. 28, 1987, at 23.
1987]
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ments recognized both the necessity of construing the language of
the Constitution and the necessity of perpetuating the vitality of the
common law. 56 Thus, the courts of this nation, from its inception,
have legitimately drawn on rich traditions of natural rights and of
the common law, both substantive and procedural. If those who
claim to value the concepts of original intent truly wish to follow
the thinking of the drafters of the Constitution, they would be wise
to remember that the Constitution, like the Bible, bears reading
again and again.
IV. TiE IMPORTANCE OF LANGUAGE
"Interpretation, as applied to written law, is the art or process
of discovering and expounding the signification of the language used,
that is, the meaning which the authors of the law designed it to
convey to others. 5 7 Not only must courts define words which are
ambiguous or unclear, but they must also rely on interpretation of
the text to determine if a law may properly be applied to a given
state of facts. 8 Immediately following the adoption of our Consti-
tution, the courts made it clear that the basis of interpretation should
be textual, with the intent of the adopters most obvious in the words
used.5 9 The delegates in Philadelphia often struggled to choose the
precise words with which to clearly convey the convention's mean-
ing, for it was their expectation that the document would be in-
terpreted by reference to its express language.60 Words are the tools
of thought. In the legal realm, they must be chosen precisely when
precise meaning is to be conveyed.
Although the National Law Journal recently expressed surprise
at the United States Supreme Court's reliance on several editions
56 U.S. CONST. amend. VII & amend. XI.
57 BLACK, supra note 18, at 1. Construction of written law, by contrast,
is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning Pnd intention of the author
of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered
doubtful either by reason of apparently conflicting provisions or directions, or by reason
of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.
Id.
5& Id. at 2.
11 Powell, supra note 15, at 900-01; Brest, supra note 10, at 215-16.
10 Powell, supra note 15, at 903-04.
[Vol. 90
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of Webster's dictionaries to determine the intent of Congress in en-
acting the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 61 there should be nothing unusual
about a court's reliance on dictionary definitions to determine the
proper meaning of a constitutional or statutory term. The language
of the law, after all, is English. The meaning of that language may
be found by consulting the dictionary. Among textualists, however,
there is often debate about as to which dictionaries should be relied
upon: those of the time the provision was first adopted or those of
the modern era. This debate seems of little importance, however,
because many of the important constitutional terms are not defined
in the older legal dictionaries. A scholar would search in vain for
a definition of "cruel and unusual punishment" or "equal protec-
tion" in the law dictionaries of the framers' time. 62 Even when at-
tempts were first made to define constitutional terms, the defini-
tions consisted of quotations from judicial opinions. 61 Definitions
for the words which make up these phrases, however, may be found
in the standard English dictionaries of the early constitutional era.
The terms used in our Constitution were carefully considered
conceptual expressions chosen by the drafters to guarantee to the
citizens of the infant nation new ideals of ordered liberty. The words
were chosen with thought and skill to capture ideas and create an
ambiance of freedom. The Constitution was written in the vulgate,
and in conducting Constitutional explication,
[t]he intent to be arrived at is that of the people, and it is not to be supposed
that they looked for any obtruse meaning in the words employed, but rather that
they have accepted them in the sense most obvious to the common understanding,
and ratified the instrument in the belief that that was the sense designed to be
conveyed.-
Courts must constantly resist the urging of technocrats, who ad-
vocate interpretion of the law in a technical sense and attempt to
61 The Court Turns to a Dictionary, THE NAT'L L.J., June 1, 1987, at 37, col. 1.
See, e.g., JACOB, A NEw LAw DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1773). Madison once wrote that the
United States government was such a novelty that words in the Constitution "were sometimes used
in a new sense and thus must be interpreted by their context or our knowledge of the intentions of
those who created the Constitution." Dewey, James Madison Helps Clio Interpret the Constitution,
XV A?. J. OF LEGAL HIST., 38 n.1 (1971).
61 See, e.g., Aa OTr's LAW DICTIONARY (1879).
May v. Topping, 65 W. Va. 656, 660, 64 S.E. 848, 850 (1909).
1987]
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produce from statutes and constitutions memorials to themselves in
the form of terms of art.6 5 "Narrow and technical reasoning ... is
misplaced when it is brought to bear upon an instrument framed
by the people themselves . . . , and designed as a chart upon which
every man, learned or unlearned, may be able to trace the leading
principles of government. '66
Alexis de Tocqueville clearly understood the strength of a law
of popular origin. In America, political democratization led to de-
mocratization of the language of the law. The individual's vote gives
him an indirect share in lawmaking. 67 The individual's representa-
tives adopt the laws, and the individual himself, as a jury member,
serves to ultimately apply the language of the law. As de Tocqueville
said, "There is a prodigious force in the expression of the wills of
a whole people. When it stands out in broad daylight, even the
imagination of those who would like to contest it is somehow smoth-
ered." 68
From the beginning of our nation's history, the courts have been
the primary interpreters of our Constitution. The written Consti-
tution, subject to judicial review, was an innovation of the revo-
lutionary period in America. 69 Judicial review, like all powers of the
federal government, is founded in the rule of law as structured by
the Constitution. 70 The basis for judicial review is not any supposed
superiority of judges over members of the legislature or the exec-
utive. Rather, it is superiority of the Constitution, which declares
that the judicial power extends to all cases arising under that doc-
ument.7'
6 It is no accident that the words "statute" and "statue" are similar. They are both related
to the Latin word "stature," meaning to set or stand up. NVEBSTER's THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 2230 (1970). Thus, one is a representation artistically rendered and the other is a rep-
resentation artfully rendered.
6 BLACK, supra note 18, at 13 (quoting Cooley, J.).
67 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMoCRACY IN AMERICA 222 (G. Lawrence trans. 1966).
68 Id.
69 Powell, supra note 15, at 887.
7 Easterbrook, An Immutable Vision, Wash. Post Mag., June 28, 1987, at 54.
1 U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 2; see WOLFE, supra note 27, at 83-84 (discussing Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).
[Vol. 90
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There is hardly a question arising in a democracy which does
not become a legal question.72 While legal questions must be resolved
consistently with the Constitution, "the Constitution is what the
judges say it is. ' ' 7" This imposes a tremendous responsibility on the
jucidiary to act as the guardians of liberty. 74 The Constitution itself
recognizes this role, requiring that all judicial officers be bound by
oath or affirmation to support the Constitution.7 Courts must honor
their oath and shun the temptation to exert naked power; rather,
every judicial decision should be a principled one, resting on the
foundation established two hundred years ago.
76
Federal Judge J. Skelly Wright aptly captured the nature of a
judge's role in constitutional adjudication. "Constitutional choices
are in fact different from ordinary decisions. The reason is simple:
the most important value choices have already been made by the
framers of the Constitution. ' 77 The West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals has long recognized its duty in constitutional cases. "The
[Supreme] Court [of Appeals] is empowered to construe, interpret
and apply provisions of the Constitution, but may not add to, distort
or ignore the plain mandates thereof. ' 78 Where the words of the
Constitution are plain to the "ordinary and reasonable mind," there
is no occasion for judicial construction, and the Constitutional pro-
vision will simply be applied. 79 Further, it is not necessary for a
72 See DE TOCQuEVILLE, supra note 67, at 248.
7 Speech by Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes at Elmira, New York (May 3, 1907), quoted
in J. BARTLETT, FAm.miAR QUOTATIONS 700 (15th ed. 1980). This statement is reminiscent of the fol-
lowing conversation between Alice and Humpty Dumpty:
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, "it means just
what I choose it to mean - neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different
things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master - that's all."
L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS (1872), quoted in J. BARTLETT, FAmILAR QUoTATIONs 613
(15th ed. 1980) (emphasis in original).
"Hughes, supra note 73.
' U.S. CONST. art. VI; see Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. at 173-79.
76 H. WECISLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 27, 103 (1961).
Wright, Professor Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L.
REv. 769, 784 (1971).
78 State ex rel. Bagley v. Blankenship, 161 W. Va. 630, 643, 246 S.E.2d 99, 107 (1978).
,1 State ex rel. Dunbar v. Stone, 159 W. Va. 331, 221 S.E.2d 791 (1976); see State ex rel.
Maloney v. McCartney, 159 W. Va. 513, 223 S.E.2d 607, appeal dismissed, Moore v. McCartney,
425 U.S. 946 (1976).
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court to engage in oblique hermenutical pursuits in applying the
Constitution, for it "should be applied ... according to common
understanding and everyday requirements of life .... ,0 Thus, re-
gardless of the jurisprudential school with which a judge may be
aligned, the conclusions should not vary, so long as the words of
the Constitution light the court's path.
' Maloney, 159 W. Va. at 523, 223 S.E.2d at 614; Charleston Transit Co. v. Condry, 140 W.
Va. 651, 659, 86 S.E.2d 391, 396 (1955).
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